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Citizens for Clean Energy v. United States Department of the Interior, 
384 F. Supp. 3d 1264 (D. Mont. 2019) 
 
Anthony P. Reed 
 
In 2017, Secretary of the Interior Ryan Zinke issued a new order 
lifting the previous administration’s 2016 Jewell Order that had placed a 
moratorium on mineral leases until a programmatic EIS was completed. 
The new order repealed the moratorium, cancelled the programmatic EIS, 
and instructed the BLM to expedite new mineral lease applications. 
Several plaintiffs challenged Zinke’s order, and the United States District 
Court for the District of Montana ruled that it was a major federal action 
that triggered NEPA analysis and that the agency acted arbitrarily and 
capriciously when it issued the order without any environmental review. 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
In Citizens for Clean Energy v. U.S. Department of the Interior,1 
the United States District Court for the District of Montana ruled on 
summary judgment motions filed by multiple environmental groups 
(“Organizational Plaintiffs”), the States of California, New Mexico, New 
York, and Washington (“State Plaintiffs"), and the Northern Cheyenne 
Tribe of American Indians (collectively “Plaintiffs”) against the 
Department of Interior (“DOI”). Plaintiffs sought environmental review of 
federal coal leases before DOI lifted a moratorium instituted by the 
previous administration.2 Plaintiffs argued that lifting the moratorium was 
a major federal action and was subject to environmental review under the 
National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”).3 DOI, the U.S. Bureau of 
Land Management (“BLM”), the States of Wyoming and Montana, and 
the National Mining Association (collectively “Defendants”) responded 
that lifting the moratorium was merely a policy shift and not a final agency 
action reviewable under the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”).4 
 
II.  FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 
In early 2016, then Secretary of the Interior Sally Jewell, issued 
an order (the “Jewell Order”) that directed BLM to conduct a 
comprehensive environmental review of the federal coal program, which 
had not been updated since 1979.5 The Jewell Order further imposed a 
moratorium on federal coal leases until the completion of a programmatic 
environmental impact statement (“PEIS”).6 In March 2017, after 
appointing Ryan Zinke (“Zinke”) as Secretary of the Interior, President 
 
1.  384 F. Supp. 3d 1264 (D. Mont. 2019). 
2.  Id. at 1274. 
3.  Id. at 1276. 
4.  Id. 
5.  Id. at 1276–77. 
6.  Id. 










Trump issued an executive order instructing Zinke to “take all steps 
necessary and appropriate to amend or withdraw the Jewell Order.”7 Zinke 
issued his order (the “Zinke Order”), directing BLM to “process coal lease 
applications and modifications expeditiously in accordance with 
regulations and guidance existing before the issuance of [the Jewell 
Order].”8 In addition to lifting the moratorium, the Zinke Order also 
concluded that completing a new PEIS or supplementing the 1979 PEIS 
of the federal coal leasing program was not necessary.9 Plaintiffs sued DOI 
in March 2017, and the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment 
in the spring and fall of 2018.10 Defendants asserted that the Zinke Order 
was a mere policy shift and did not constitute a major federal action 
triggering environmental review under NEPA.11 Defendants further 
argued that Plaintiffs lacked standing and the claim was not ripe for 
adjudication.12 
 
III.  ANALYSIS 
  
The court examined Defendants’ challenges of standing and 
ripeness before addressing Plaintiffs’ NEPA claims, which alleged DOI 
and BLM failed to conduct any kind of environmental review to lift the 
moratorium and failed to complete a programmatic EIS of the federal coal 
leasing program.13 The court then analyzed the Northern Cheyenne Tribes’ 
trust obligation claim and Plaintiffs’ Federal Land Policy Management 
Act (“FLPMA”) and Mineral Leasing Act (“MLA”) claims.14 
 
A.  Standing 
 
 Defendants asserted that Plaintiffs lacked Article III standing 
because the alleged harm was conjectural and no imminent threat 
existed.15 Defendants’ claim rested on the notion that four events must 
happen before Plaintiffs could establish imminent harm: “(1) an operator 
applies to lease land or to modify a lease where Plaintiffs' members 
recreate; (2) a BLM office completes an environmental assessment (“EA”) 
or [environmental impact statement (“EIS”)] and determines the fair 
market value of the coal and approves the lease modification; (3) a surface 
mining permit is issued; and (4) the mining plan is approved.”16  
 
7.  Id. at 1271 (internal quotations omitted). 
8.  Id. at 1271–72 (internal quotations omitted). 
9.  Id. at 1272. 
10.  Id. at 1270–71. 
11.  Id. at 1272. 
12.  Id. at 1273–75. 
13.  Id. at 1273–82. 
14.  Id. at 1282. 
15.  Id. at 1273. 
16.  Id. 







However, the court reasoned that waiting until individual leases 
have been processed and coal had been leased and mined would ignore 
Plaintiffs’ procedural injuries.17 The court stated a procedural injury 
occurs “‘when governmental decision makers make up their minds 
without having before them an analysis of the likely effects of their 
decision on the environment.’”18  
The court held that DOI ignored the requirements of NEPA before 
ending the moratorium on issuing coal-leases.19 Demonstrating a 
“threatened concrete interest[,]” the State Plaintiffs each showed harm 
within their geographic boundaries from emissions associated with 
burning coal and held an interest in how the production, transportation, 
and consumption of coal affect the earth and air.20 Additionally, the 
Organizational Plaintiffs and the Northern Cheyenne Tribe were able to 
show a threatened concrete interest by alleging environmental harm from 
issuance of pending coal leases, as well as harm to cultural sites used in 
ceremonies.21 Accordingly, Plaintiffs asserted a procedural right under 
NEPA and were denied an opportunity to influence the disposition of coal-
lease applications, and Defendants’ engagement in the NEPA process 
would redress these procedural issues.22 Based on these holdings, the court 
concluded that Plaintiffs had sufficiently alleged a procedural injury to 
establish standing.23 
 
B.  NEPA 
 
 As to the merits, Plaintiffs asserted that the Zinke Order, which 
reversed the Jewell Order placing a moratorium on federal coal leases, 
constituted a final, major federal action requiring NEPA review.24 
Plaintiffs also asserted that Defendants’ failure to comply with NEPA by 
neglecting to complete any environmental analysis of the Zinke Order is 
reviewable under the APA.25  
The court held the Zinke Order marked a major federal action—
rather than a distinct policy shift—that had the potential to have a 
significant impact on the environment, further holding that Defendants’ 
failure to begin NEPA review was arbitrary and capricious.26 The court 
 
17.  Id. at 1275. 
18.  Id. (quoting Citizens for Better Forestry v. U.S. Dep't of Agric., 341 
F.3d 961, 971 (9th Cir. 2003)). 
19.  Id. at 1277. 
20. Id. at 1274 (quoting WildEarth Guardians v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 
795 F.3d 1148, 1154 (9th Cir. 2015)).  
21. Id.  
22.  Id. at 1275. 
23.  Id. (also holding Plaintiffs' claims were ripe because the alleged 
procedural injury had already occurred and the action may be the sole opportunity to 
challenge the entire coal-leasing program nationwide). 
24.  Id. at 1276–80. 
25.  Id. at 1279–81. 
26.  Id. at 1281. 










analogized California ex rel. Lockyer v. U.S. Department of Agriculture27 
—where the Bush administration overturned a seven-month-old 
nationwide plan enacted by the Clinton administration—to the current 
case.28 The Clinton administration’s plan was meant to ensure the 
connectivity of roadless areas in the national forest.29 President Bush’s 
administration sought to overturn the plan with a new rule it concluded 
was a categorical exclusion (“CE”) because it was “merely procedural in 
nature and scope . . . [with] no direct, indirect, or cumulative effect on the 
environment.”30 The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
reasoned in Lockyer that because the plan benefitted the roadless areas and 
their ecosystems, it could not be characterized as merely procedural.31 The 
court found that the Lockyer analysis applied to Citizens for Clean Energy 
because the moratorium was a nationwide programmatic plan reversed by 
the subsequent administration32 that also benefited the areas closed off to 
mineral leases and their environments.33 
 Plaintiffs asserted that NEPA required DOI to complete an EIS 
with respect to the Zinke Order; however, the court noted that the requisite 
“hard look” of environmental impacts under NEPA does not categorically 
require an EIS.34 Still, the court stated that NEPA requires some 
environmental analysis, which can be accomplished through “a less 
extensive EA and a finding of no significant impact statement 
(“FONSI”),” or an EIS.35 Additionally, the court discussed CEs, where 
under this designation, environmental review is not necessary to comply 
with NEPA as long as the proposed action does not individually or 
cumulatively have a significant effect on the human environment.'36 The 
court did not find it appropriate, however, for DOI to refrain from 
environmental analysis all together because a substantial question existed 
that “the lifting of the moratorium could cause environmental impacts 
from expedited coal mining on public lands.”37 
 The court determined that DOI’s decision to lift the moratorium 
was reviewable under the APA because it was a final agency action.38 The 
court stated that the conditions which prove an agency action is final are: 
(1) “the action must mark the ‘consummation’ of the agency's decision 
 
27.  575 F.3d 999 (9th Cir. 2009). 
28.  Citizens for Clean Energy, 384 F. Supp. 3d at 1278. 
29.  Id. (citing California ex rel. Lockyer v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 575 
F.3d 999, 1008 (9th Cir. 2009)). 
30.  Id. (quoting Lockyer, 575 F.3d at 1008). 
31.  Id. 
32.  Id. 
33.  Id. 
34.  Id. at 1276, 1281. 
35.  Id. (citing Lockyer, 575 F.3d at 1012; 40 C.F.R. § 1508.4). 
36.  Id. at 1276, 1279 (citing Lockyer, 575 F.3d at 1012, 1018; 40 C.F.R. 
§ 1508.4). 
37.  Id. at 1279–82 (citing Lockyer, 575 F.3d at 1012). 
38.  Id. at 1281. 







making process . . . it must not be of a merely tentative or interlocutory 
nature;” and (2) “the action must be one by which ‘rights or obligations 
have been determined,’ from which ‘legal consequences will flow.’”39 The 
court found that the Zinke Order met the requirements for final agency 
action because the DOI made a conscious decision not to initiate the NEPA 
process.40  
 Finally, Plaintiffs requested the court to order DOI to complete 
preparation of the PEIS as set out in the Jewell Order or, alternatively, to 
supplement the 1979 PEIS to weigh the impacts of coal combustion on 
greenhouse gases in the atmosphere.41 However, the court held that 
nothing in NEPA nor DOI’s own documents supported this relief42 
because the major federal action was the initial PEIS from 1979—not the 
reliance on it—even if the information is outdated.43 The court noted that 
NEPA is a procedural process which ensures an agency will make an 
informed decision by taking a “hard look” at the “environmental 
consequences[,]”44  and that significant deference is given to federal 
agencies on how they choose to obtain that information.45 The court further 
stated that an agency must only show that it did not act arbitrarily or 
capriciously in what avenue of environmental analysis it chose— whether 
an EIS, an EA/EIS, an EA/FONSI, or a CE.46 Because Defendants may 
satisfy NEPA’s requirements in variety of manners, the court deferred to 
Defendants to first take the prerequisite step to determine the “extent of 
environmental analysis that the Zinke Order requires” pursuant to 
NEPA.47 
  
C.  Unreviewable Claims 
 
 Plaintiffs additionally asserted that the Zinke Order, and the DOI’s 
underlying failure to prepare an EIS, breached the Federal Government’s 
trust obligation to the Northern Cheyenne Tribe.48 Because the court ruled 
that the Zinke Order triggered NEPA—while lacking the authority to 
compel the DOI to prepare an EIS—the court was therefore unable to 
review the trust claim, as it was contingent upon completion of NEPA 
review.49  
 
39.  Id. at 1280 (citing Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 177–78 (1997)). 
40.  Id. at 1280-81 
41.  Id. at 1281. 
42.  Additionally, federal courts “cannot compel an agency to take 
specific actions.” Id. (citing Gardner v. U.S. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 638 F.3d 1217, 
1221 (9th Cir. 2011)). 
43.  Id. at 1277–78. 
44.  Id. at 1272. 
45.  Id. at 1282. 
46.  Id.   
47.  Id. (also noting that if DOI or BLM did not find an EIS necessary, 
they must explain the insignificance Zinke Order’s impacts with a “convincing 
statement of reasons”) (internal citation omitted)). 
48.  Id. 
49.  Id.  










Further, Plaintiffs claimed that DOI violated FLPMA and MLA 
by failing to provide an explanation for striking down the Jewell Order and 
replacing it with the Zinke Order.50 The court held this issue was unripe 
and said it would not reach a decision on it until DOI had completed its 
environmental analysis under NEPA.51 
 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
 
 The United States District Court for the District of Montana held 
that the DOI’s Zinke Order violated NEPA by failing to include analysis 
of the potential environmental impacts of its decision to replace the Jewell 
Order.52 The court declined to rule on several of Plaintiffs’ claims, 
including the trust obligation to the Northern Cheyenne Tribe and claims 
under FLPMA and the MLA, until DOI had an opportunity to comply with 
NEPA.53 Additionally, the court refused to compel the DOI to complete a 
new PEIS or supplement the 1979 PEIS.54 The court ordered the parties 
to, in good faith, discuss appropriate remedies and come to an agreement 
consistent with the court’s decision, and further ordered the parties to brief 
the application of the Monsanto factors for an injunction, if they could not 
reach an agreement.55 
 In May 2019, approximately a month after the court issued this 
decision, the BLM issued a draft EA stating that lifting the moratorium 
would have no significant environmental impact.56 An agency must do 
more than nothing and provide convincing reasons for its action. Although 
courts give agencies deference, this opinions also demonstrate that they 
are reluctant to evaluate the sufficiency of the agencies’ analysis when 
they have chosen the correct path to comply with NEPA. 
 
50. Id.  
51.  Id.   
52.  Id.  
53.  Id.  
54. Id.  
55.  Id. (citing Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 561 U.S. 139 
(2010)). 
56.  Lifting the Pause on the Issuance of New Federal Coal Leases for 
Thermal (Steam) Coal Environmental Assessment, DOI-BLM-WO-WO2100-2019-
0001-EA (U.S. Dep’t of Interior May 22, 2019). 
